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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper pulls together the major results of the various
i_/
Studies on urban informal credit markets (ICMs). The major
topics are organized according to the terms of reference (TOR)
for the country study drawn up by Ghate (1986) which were
favorably considered by researchers of participating countries
during a workshop helm in Manila on 28 - 30 May 1986.
The TOR cover.s a wide range of topics which ought to be
considered in the country study. However, the peculiar charac-
terlstics of the Philippine financial system (both formal and
informal) and the limited budget for the study preclude us from
including all the suggested topics.
*Vlce-Presldent, Philippine Institute for Development
Studies.
The views expressed in this Study are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.
i_/
See Lamberte (1988); Lamberte and Bunda (1988), Lamberte
and Balbosa (1988), and Lamberte and Jose (1988). These are
parts of a larger Study on ICMS in the Philippines, sponsored by
the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
2In an effort to follow closely the TOR, Some important
findings which are unique to ;the segments of the ICMs under Study
are purposely left out. Major policy implications will be
discussed later, after integrating the results of all studies on
ICMs in the Philippines under this project.
II. MAJOR STRUCTURE OF THE INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS, SIZE AND
TRENDS IN SIZE, AND POLICY AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
Before one proceeds with studying the ICMs, it iS neces-sary
to draw a line first between formal and informal credit markets,
and then identify the segments belonging to the latter. It has
been fashionable to say that LDCs are characterized by a
dualistic financialsystem. On one hand, there exist the formal
Credit markets (FCMs) which are regulated by state agencies. On
the other hand, there exist the informal credit markets (ICMs)
which perform certain financial functions but operate "outside
the orbit of institutional and officially regulated finance"
(Chandavarkar [1987]). This characterization of the financial
market leaves the impression that one has to make a big jump in
order to go from one segmented Sector to the other. This is not
the case in the Philippines. What we have instead is a continuum
with participants in the financial market regulated at varying
degrees. Some are less regulated than the others whereby they
achieve a greater degree of flexibility almost Similar to that of
completely unregulated participants. The problem now is where to
draw the line so that we can properly identify segments of the
o
financial system that belong to the ICMs and FCMs.
3The most important hallmark of the ICMS is flexibility.
ICMs are flexible because they function "outside the purview of
regulations imposed on the formal sector with respect to capital,
reserves and liquidity requirements, ceilings on lending and
deposit rates, mandatory credit targets, and audit and reporting
requirements" (Ghate [1986]). In the Philippines, only the
Central Bank imposes such regulations on financial intermediaries
directly under its supervision. We may then say that financial
intermediaries which do not fall under the direct supervision of
the CentralBank belong to the ICMs. Given this definition, we
can classify two groups of participants in the ICMs. One group
consists of those which are registered with a particular govern-
ment agency but are exempted by law from regulations imposed by
the Central Bank. The other group is composed of financial
intermediaries which are not registered with any government agen-
cy. If they would be registered, they will then have to be
subjected to Central Bank regulations because of the very nature
of their operations. Note, however, that they are not
,necessarily illegal in the sense that sanctions can be applied to
them once they become known to authorities. Central Bank
regulations and sanctions, after all, can only be extended to
officially registered institutions.
In the Philippines, quite a number of regulatory changes
have been effected through the years. It is worth noting that
financial intermediaries which once operated outside of Central
Bank regulations are now registered with and supervised by it.
4A description of the Philippine financial system and a brief
review of its regulatory environment can help clarify these
issues. The financial system can best be described by grouping
financial intermediaries under the regulatory agency(ies)
directly supervising them (see Figure I).
The Central Bank was explicitly given the mandate to oversee
all banking institutions. Its control over banking institutions
was meant to ensure the effectiveness of the monetary policy
instruments. The usual regulations, such as minimum capital and
reserve requirements, interest rate ceilings, etc., were applied
to these institutions. As the economy grew, the financial system
became more sophisticated. Thus, in the 196_s, several compa-
nies/ entities registered with specific government agencies par-
tioipated in the credit markets without being regulated by the
Central Bank. New financial instruments, called deposit substi-
tutes, started toemerge in the market. All these innovations
arose as a esponse to the repression of the financial system.
On the basis of the nature of their operations, the
registered financial institutions may be grouped into three broad
categories namely: (i) institutions which regularly engage in
the lending of funds obtained from the public in the form of
deposits; (2) institutions which regularly engage in the lending
of funds obtained from the public through the issuance of their
own debt instruments other than deposits, such as acceptances,
promissory notes, participations, etc.; and (3) institutions
which regularly engage in the lending of funds but do not obtain
funds from the public (either as deposits or their own debt
"
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6instrumentS). The Second and third groups are called non-bank
financial intermediaries (NBFIS). Of the three groups, only the
• first wasunder the Supervision of the Central Bank before 1972.
The restwere not regulated by the Central Bank, although they
were registered with other government agencies (e.g. Securities
and Exchange Commission, Department of Trade and Industry), and
as such could then be considered as Segments of the ICMs.
The phenomenal growth of the NBFIs, especially in the 196_s,
caused a major decline in the volume of total resources of the
financial system subject to the direct control of the Central
Bank. Funds shifted to the NBFIS because they paid interest
rates much higher than the regulated rates. This threatened the
effectiveness of monetary policy. The 1972 financial reforms
tried to correct this weakness by putting all banking institu-
tions and NBFIs under the control and Supervision of the Central
Bank. This is more or less along the lines suggested by Gurley
and Shaw. According to the Central Bank definition, NBFIs
include:
(a) A person or entity licensed and/or registered with any
government regulatory body as a non-bank financial _nter-
medlary, Such as an investment house, investment company,
financing company, securities dealer/broker, lending invest-
or, pawnshop, money broker, •funds manager, cooperative,
insurance company, non-stock savings and loan association,
and building and loan association.
(b) A person or entity which holds itself out as a non-banklng
financial intermediary, Such as by the use of a business
name, which includes the term "financing', 'finance"
"investment", "lending" and/or word phrase of similar import
whlch.connotes financial intermediation, or an entity which
advertises Itself as a financial intermediary, and is
engaged in a function where finahcial intermediation is
implied.
In general, NBFIs are not allowed to borrow from the public.
The term "public" refers to twenty or more creditors at any one
time. However, NBFIs may obtain a license to have "quasi-
banking" functions, in which case they are allowed to borrow from
the public provided that deposits are not •among the debt
instruments they issue.
All the financial institutions which are under the
supervision of the Central Bank belong to the formal credit
markets (FCMs_). They are all subject to the minimum capital
requirement, although this varies across different types of
financial entities. For example, banks have higher capital
requirements than non-banking institutions. Their debt
instruments are subject to a specific reserve requirement ratio.
!/
Their borrowings and loan portfolio, particularly DOSRI
accounts, are frequently monitored by the Central Bank. Super-
vlslon includes not only the mere issuance of rules, but visit-
orial powers as well so that regulations can be fully Imple-
mented, and if violated, sanctions can be effectively imposed on
violators.
!/
DOSRI accounts•are bank loans to its directors, officers,
•Stockholders and related interests.
8It is then clear that in the• Philippines, finance companies,
pawnshops and lending investors • belong to the •FCMs, unlike in
other countries. There was a time when several finance companies
Succeeded •in borrowing from the public without getting an
authorization from the Central Bank. These were, of course,
illegal. It became known to the authorities and the public only
when a crisis hit the financial system in 1981. The Central Bank
acted swiftly by revoking the license of the violators.
Insurance companies, both government and public, have never
been under the supervision of the Central Bank. The Insurance
Commission, which is an independent body, is empowered to
regulate insurance companies. It is to be noted that insurance
companies also engage in direct lending, although it is still
limited to their own members. Their funds come mainly from the
sale of insurance policieS, not from the issuance of • debt
instruments similar to those issued by•NBFIs. However, insurance
companies are required to submit financial statistics tO the
Central Bank. The purpose is to ascertain the effects of their
operations on the monetary, credit and exchange situation of the
country, and not to supervise them. Since this allows the
Central Bank to maintain its control over total liquidity of the
System, insurance companies may be considered part of the FCMs.
Another group of financial institutions is the cooperative
credit unions (CCUs). They operate like mutual savings and loan
associations raising deposits from their members at one end and
providing loans to their members at the other end. Except for
the cooperative rural banks which are registered •as rural banks
9under the Rural Banking Act, CCUs are not under the supervision
of the Central Bank. Nor are they required to submit financial
reports to the Central Bank. The Bureau of Cooperatives
Development (BCOD), which iS attached to the Department of
Agriculture, iS empowered to regulate CCUs. However, their
functions are minimal and do not include a monitoring of the loan
portfolio or the imposition of reserve requirements and other
intermediation taxes. Thus, cooperative credit unions operate
virtually free of any regulations imposed by the Central Bank on
the financial intermediaries under its jurisdiction. Neither are
they monitored by the Central Bank. As a result, they have
greater flexibility compared to financial intermediaries oper-
ating under Central Bank's rules. Interestingly, many of these
cooperative credit unions are even larger than some rural banks
and thrift banks.
Since CCUs are not supervised by the Central Bank, and since
there are no Central Bank-like regulations imposed on their
liabilities and loan portfolio, they can be considered as segment
of the ICMs.
Aside from cooperative credit unions, there are many
institutions/individuals that perform financial intermediation
functions. Some of them raise deposits for on-lending. Others
use their own funds for on-lending. To the extent that they are
not subject to Central Bank regulations, they are considered
Segments of the ICMs. These include the "paluwagan" or ROSCAS,
landlord-lenders, traders/input Suppliers, trader/miller lenders,
farmer-lenders, and professional moneylenders, among others.
10
The financial policy environment has been greatly altered in
the past two decades. In 1980, a set of financial reforms was
introduced, including the removal of interest rate ceilings and
the reductfon of differentiation among types of financial insti-
tutions to encourage more competition. Towards the latter part
of 1985, the Central Bank started to align the redlscounting rate
with the market rate. Likewise, special credit programs were
phased out, This iS not to say that the financial market is now
fully deregulated. In fact, restrictive regulations still
remain. Branching and portfolio ceiling regulations are examples
of SuCh (see Lamberte [1987]). Also, existing intermediation
taxes that drive a wedge between deposit and lending rate are
Still being imposed.
To Satisfy the terms of reference (TOR) of this study, we
have focused on four major Sources of credit in the urban ICMs,
namely: (i) professional moneylenders; (2) "paluwagan" which is
a form of ROSCAS; (3) Cooperative credit uDion; and (4) input
suppliers. AS one goes through the results of the various
studies, he can observe the relative importance of friends/
relatives as Sources of credit. However, we have not emphasized
the role of this segment of the ICMs in our studies.
We have included pawnshops in this project because they are
the least regulated among the financial institutions belonging to
the formal financial markets. The comparative analysis is made
richer'with their inclusion. Also, the inter-country comparisons
can be facilitated especially if pawnshops are considered as
a segment of the ICMs in other countries.
11
The project did not conduct a national survey mainly due to
budget constraint. Instead, the case method approach was used.
Thus, the role of moneylenders and "paluwagan" was analyzed by
studying the financial markets in one low-income urban community.
A Sample of institution-based and market-based credit unions
operating in Metro Manila and their members was utilized to
examine the role of this Segment in the ICMs. As regards input
Suppliers and trade credits, the footwear industry in Marikina,
Metro Manila was chosen as the subject of the study.
The approach utilized in this project makes it virtually
impossible to provide an estimate of the size of the urban ICMs,
much less to establish the trends in their size. However, some
indicative figures can be obtained from various studies. In
Sapang Palay where no formal financial institution is operating,
20 professional moneylenders were found to be active with esti-
mated combined resources of _1.05 million as of 1987. Thus, the
density ratio iS one moneylender per 860 households. Twenty (20)
business-oriented "paluwagan" were also found to be active with
an estimated membership of 193. Since the number of stalls in
the public market is 191, it means that virtually all
Stallholders are members of a "paluwagan".
On a cumulative basis, resources raised by the ten
"paluwagans" are estimated to reach _7.2 million pesos in 1987.
The Size of the "paiuwagan" must be large even in areas where
formal financial institutions operate. For example, it was
found that 28 percent of the sample members of institution- and
12
market-based credit unions are also members of a "paluwagan" and
contributed an average amount of _19,096 between January to
September 1987. It seems that the potential of the "paluwagan"
in mobilizing deposits among non-wealthy individuals/households
has been overlooked.
Cooperative credit unions (CCUs) are popular in the country,
yet very little is known about their size. A rec_nt study stated
that there were 1,469 active credit unions in 1980 with a total
membership Of 167,844 (see USAID [1987]). However, there is no
up-to-date information about their combined assets as well as
their sources and uses of funds. In Table I, we put together the
combined assets of the 44 members of NAMVESCO plus the assets of
the four institution-based credit unions included in the study.
/
AS of 1986, the assets of these CCUs amounted to _40.4 million in
real terms or _278.7 million in nominal terms. These are roughly
28 percent of the combined assets of all pawnshops in the country
in the same year. Thus, it can be surmised that the total size
of the CCUs as a system is at least as large as that of the
pawnshops. What is interesting is that its absolute size is
growing faster than that of pawnshops and the banking system.
The figures alsosuggest that therelative sizes of the unregu-
lated (i.e., CCUs) and the least regulated financial institutions
(i.e., pawnshops) expanded during the crisis period at the
expense of highly regulated financial institutions (i.e., banking
system).
Table I
COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED CREDIT UNIONS,
PAWNSHOPS AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS
Selected Credit Unions Pawnshops Banking System
mml--m
Year Real Assets Growth Rate Real Assets Growth Rate Real Assets Growth Rate
(PM) (%) (PM) (%) (PM) (%)
1980 - - 101.6 9.7 63,206.2 6.0
1981 - - 105.9 4.2 67,343.8 6.6
1982 21.6 - iii.i 4.9 75,061.5 11.5
1983 25.1 16.2 114.1 2.7 82,801.7 10.3
p
1984 21.8 13.2 108.3 -5.0 65,587.1 -20.8
1985 25.5 17.0 119.3 10.1 55,810.0 -14.9
1986 40.4 58.4 146.6 22.9 41,160.0 -26.2
Sources: Table 2 (Lamberte [1988]); NAMVESCO Annual Reports (various years); and
Financial Statements of a sample of Cooperative Credit Unions.
...%
&u
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Wehave a more precise estimate of the size of trade credits
which we obtained from the flow-of-funds table prepared by the
Central Bank (see Table 2). Trade credits availed of by the
manufacturing Sector in 1986 amounted to _22 billion in nominal
terms. Both the absolute andrelative size of trade credits had
been increasing since 1979 and reached a peak in 1983, a year
before the full effect of the balance-of-payments crisis was
felt. When banks continued to reduce their lending activities in
1985 and 1986 in view of the instability of the economy, the
manufacturing sector increased their dependence on trade credits.
The figures on trade credits presented in Table 2 could have
grossly underestimated the actual volume of trade credits since
the flow-of-funds table made use only of data from corporations
belonging to the top 1000_corporations. In our study of the
footwear industry in Marikina where none of the firms belong to
the top 10_0 corporations, trade credits comprise 82 percent of
the value of the sales of the sample footwear manufacturers and
8_ percent of the value of their material inputs. In 1986,
Sales of the Sample firms averaged _1.4 million while annual
value of material inputs averaged _0.4 million.
III. SAVINGS, CONSUMPTION CREDIT, ALLOCATION EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
INTERACTION WITH FORMAL SECTORS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MONE-
TARY POLICY AND DEPOSITOR SECURITY
The Savin_gs mobilization role varies according to the Seg-
ments of the ICMs. In general, professional moneylenders do not
15
mobilize depositS. The results of our study Support this. Funds
for on-lendlng come mainly from their earnings from employment
Table 2
TYPES OF CREDIT OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR
(In Million Pesos)
Year Loans Trade Credits Total
1979 112,836.2 13,540.5 126,376.7
(89.3) (10.7) (100.0)
1980 115,553.1 20,894.1 136,447.2
(84.7) (15.3) (100.0)
1981 129,477.2 19,916.3 146,393.5
(86.7) (13.3) (100.0)
1982 140,146.7 27,079.0 167,225.7
(83.8) (16.2) (100.0)
1983 155,369.0 31,878.8 187,247.'8
(83.0) (17.0) (100.0)
1984 119,154.0 15,891.0 135,045.0
(88.2) (11.8) (100.0)
1985 77,091.6 27,753.9 104,845.5
(73.5) (26.5) (100.0)
1986 79,718.4 22,376.0 102,094.4
(78.1) (21.9) (100.0)
Source: Table VI.I (Lamberte and Jose [1988])
IIB
business. One started lending money by using the income of her
husband who works in Saudi Arabia. However, there is an
exception to this general observation. In Sapang Palay, one
moneylender is found to be playing the role of an indigenous
banker, She accepts time deposits for as low as _100 and pays an
interest of 80 percent per annum. This is an opportunity not
provided by banks whose minimum time deposit is _5,000, an amount
much higher than what low-income earners can afford. As of the
date of the interview, this moneylender had 51 depositors with
combined deposits amounting to _40,200. This comprised about 70
percent of her loanable funds. This demonstrates the capability
of moneylenders to mobilize deposits. What seems to be import-
ant is that they can fashion out an instrument that is attract-
ire and affordable to low-income earners.
The CCUs and "paluwagan" are an important means of
mobilizing deposits among low-income earners. These are
basically self-help institutions designed to assist those who do
not have access to the credit facilities of the banking system.
Saving with these institutions entail very low transactions cost
Simply because they operate in a limited geographic setting,
e.g., public markets, offices, etc. and cater to fairly homoge-
neous individuals, e.g., market vendors, employees, etc. In Such
a situation, it is very easy to install a low cost system of
collecting deposits like hiring collectors in the 9ase of market-
based CCUs and payroll deduction in the case of institution-based
CCUS. In contrast, the transactions cost for depositing in a
bank is prohibitively high. Our study, for instance, shows that
_7
a bank depositor living in Sapang Palay spends on the average
_13.93 every time he deposlts/wlthdraws money from a bank.
One attractive feature of these informal savings institu-
tions is reciprocity. Members save with t_e expectation that
they can borrow, and they tend to save more if they want to
borrow more. As shown by the results, these savings institutions
facilitate saving-investment decisions of low-income earners. In
particular, the existence of a variety of "paluwagan" offers them
opportunities to save and overcome the problem of indivisibl-
lities in investment and consumption in accordance with their
financial capacity.
Savings mobilized by CCUS and "paluwagan" are quite
substantial (see Table 3). AS of the date of the interview, the
average fixed deposit of the sample CCU members stood at _9,145.
This is about 12 times greater than their average initial fixed
deposits. Considering that respondents of the studyhave been
members of their respective credit unions for an average of 8.7
years, it means that on the average, each member has been in-
creasing his fixed deposit by _967 per year. In Sapang Palay,
"paluwagan" members received "sahod" or kitty averaging _26,_80
from the "paluwagan" for the past two years. These are not
insignificant amount of savings mobilized by such institutions.
There are clear indications that the existence of CCUs and
"paluwagan" has brought about net addition to total financial
savings. For instance, among the sample CCU members, almost half
do not have deposits with a bank, and among the sample
18
Table 3
SAVING BEHAVIOR OF CCU MEMBERS
FixedDeposlts Savings Deposit Time Deposits
No. Ave. Amt. No. Ave. Amt. No. Ave. Amt,
(P) (P) (P)
i. CCU 82* 9,144.25 46 13,301.6_ - -
(56.1)
2. Banks - - 45 38,584.10 12 32,287.54
3. Paluwagan .... 22 19,_96.26
*Two respondents did not give the answer.
Note: Figures in parentheses are percent.
Source: Table V.16 (Lamberte and Balbosa [1988]).
19
"paluwagan" members, 72 percent do not have deposits in a bank.
Interestingly, among bank depositors, only a handful of them were
able to borrow from a bank (see Tables 4 and 5).
Segmentation Seems to be more pronounced in the ICMs than in
the FCMs. For instance, cooperative credit unions and
"paluwagan" tend to operate in areas where members are fairly
homogeneous, like all are market vendors in the same locality, or
employees of the same firm. Loans are given only to members.
Input suppliers do the same. That is, they grant trade and cash
credits only to manufacturers directly buying raw materials from
them. Even moneylenders tend to narrow down their lending to
,suki" or prime clients. Indeed, this puts into question the
allocative functions of the ICMs. The high degree of
segmentation seems to prevent these institutions from channeling
funds from low to high productivity uses.
The perceived favorable equity impact of ICMs can also be
questioned. For example, one credit union was found charging
25.2 percent per annum for loans up to _5_0 with a maturity
period of 5 months while it charges only 13 percent per annum for
loans above _i,@@@ with a maturity period of 12 months. With the
loan capacity formula which credit unions are using, big deposit-
ors can borrow amounts Several times larger £han those of small
depositors. This is aggravated by the fact that the effective
interest rate iS not adjusted according to risk. Likewise,
results Show that input suppiiers tend to charge higher effective
interest rate on trade credits to small footwear manufacturers
than to big footwear manufacturerS.
20
Table 4
BORROWING BEHAVIOR OF CCU MEMBERS, JANUARY - SEPTEMBER 1987
(i) (2) (3) (4)
Sources of Credit No. of Average Average Average
Respondents Amount Maturity Interest
Borrowed
(_) days (%)
!/
i. CCU 80 21,760..30 258.7 19.5
(97.6) (23,615.20) (572.4) (5.8)
2. Banks 4 12,750.00 322.5 19.5
(4.9) (18,191.12) (75.0) (7.33)
\
3. Professional 7 2,785.70 65.7 120.0
Moneylenders (8.2) (2,118.50) (30.3) (0.0)
2_/ 3j
4. Friends/Neigh- 14 10,607.14 95.0 6.0
bors/Relatives (17.0) (10,388.93) (60.0) (-)
6_/
5. Traders/Suppliers 26 51,613.46 53.5 29.3
(51.0) (121,792.49) (19.3) (4.2)
6. Paluwagan 22 19,096.26 - -
(26.8) (41,486.10) - -
i_/
Effective interest rate which is the interest rate
discounted in advance plus all charges.
Refers to only 7 respondents. The other 7 respondents have
loans without maturity.
3_/
Refers to only one respondent. The other 13 respondents were
not charged interest on their loans.
4/
Refers to only those who are engaged in a business.
5_/
Refers to an average amount borrowed per month.
6_/
Price differential between goods bought in cash and on credit.
This is based on theresponses from 15 respondents.
Note: Figures in parentheses in column (I) are percent,
while in columns (2) - (4) are standard deviations.
Source: Table V. 21 (Lamberte and Balbosa [1988]).
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Table 5
ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF LOANS, MATURITY PERIOD AND INTEREST RATE
Source Respondent Average Average Average
Number % of Total Maturity Interest Amount•
Period Rate (%/ Borrowed
(Days) annum) * (B)
Bank 0 0 - - -
Savings
Association 4 8.9 67.5 66.2 1,137.50
Moneylenders 9 20.0 76.4 iii.ii 1,558.89
Relatives 8 17.8 10.62 0.0 2,525.00
Traders/
Suppliers 24 53.3 12.58 0.0 3,481.67
Others
(friends,
neighbors,
etc.) 7 15.6 23.43 13.7 12,021.43
Source.. Table V. ll (Lamberte and Bunda [1988]).
22 ••
In general, lenders in the ICMs do not restrict the use of
loan proceeds, This is one of the attractive •features of ICMs.
Table 6 shows how borrowers allocated the loans obtained from CCU
and "paiUwagan". The kinds of members of these savings and
credit institutions determine to a large extent the uses of the
loans. It should be noted that most members of the sample CCUs
and "paluwagan" are market vendors. Thus, a great proportion of
the loan proceeds was used for producti_e purposes. The
relatively short maturity period of these loans prompted
borrowers to use them for augmenting their working capital. I_t
is to be noted, however, that a significant proportion of • the
loan proceeds was used for other purposes, such as family
consumption, house repairs/improvement, acquisiton of household
appliances, education, etc. Productive consumption seems to be
one of the important uses of loans.
Whether formal and informal sectors are substitutes or com-
plementary to each other is indeed an important issue that must
be dealt with. It is, however, unfortunate that the nature of
the data of the various studies do not permit us to construct a
model to test such hypothesis. Nevertheless, some indicative
results can be obtained from the various studies. One inaicator
i
of the substitutability of both sectors is that one expands at
the expense of the other. We can perhaps examine the behavior of
Some Segments of the urban ICMs through time since these are the
only information available to us. When looking at the data on
hand, it must be recalled that the Philippines suffered the worst
economic crisis during the period 1984 - 1986. As may be seen in
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Table 6
USES OF LOAN PROCEEDS
(In Percent)
•Uses CCU Paluwagan
Business 60.0 49.2
Household appliances/furniture 5.8 3.2
House repairs/improvements 1.9 10.2
Family consumption 6.4 9.6
Payment of loans 3.7 12.3
Loans to others 1.7 2.4
Savings 0.9 7.8
Education 8.1 0.5
Medical care 2.5 -
House/lot acquisition 1.2 -
Application for overseas job - i.I
Jewelries 0.1 -
Others 7.7 3.8
Sources: Table V.8 (Lamberte and Bunda [1988]) and Table V.13
(Lamberte and Balbosa [1988]).
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Table I, the real assets of both the selected CCUs and the bank,
ing system had been growing before 1984. However, during the
crisis period, the real assets of the banking system had been
shrinking while those of the selected CCUs had been increasing.
Pawnshops; which are the least regulated among the formal finan-
cial institutions, follow the same growth pattern as that of
CCUs. The same can be said of trade credits. As shown in Table
2, both bank lo_ns and trade credits grew in absolute terms
before 1984. During the economic crisis both types of credit
dropped precipitously. However, trade credits recovered fast and
even increased their size relative to bank loans, implying that
the manufacturing sector increased its dependence on trade
credits when bank loans became scarcer.
Viewed from the macro perspective, results seem to suggest
that during normal times, both the formal and informal sectors
are complementary, while during abnormal times, both are substi-
tutes to each other. This general observation should however be
qualified by taking into consideration the survey results. As
already pointed out, financial markets in LDCs are severely
fragmented. One cannot easily move from one market to the other.
Thus, for non-wealthy individuals who do not have access to bank
credit, %he question of substitutability between formal and
informal credit sectors is irrelevant. As can be gathered from
Table 4 and Table 5, only a handful had access to bank credit.
However, among segments of the ICMs, some element of substituta-
bility seems to exist. For instance, CCUS and "paluwagan" were
organized partly to free members from moneylenders. Thus, only
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very few CCU and "paluwagan" members borrowed from moneylenders.
Even the moneylender who organized two "paluwagan" units does not
lend to the members of her "paluwagan". Also, the availability
of trade credits has somewhat reduced the demand for credit from
moneylenders.
There seems to be a weak linkage between formal and informal
sectors. None of the sample CCUs ever borrowed from a bank.
Banks serve as a depository of CCU funds. However, in 1986
deposits with banks comprised only 6 percent of their total
assets. The "interlending scheme" which is currently gaining
popularity among CCU federations may further weaken this linkage
(see below for details). Also, none of the moneylenders inter-
viewed ever borrowed from a bank to finance their lending
operations.
Input suppliers have very limited contact with banks as
sources of additional funds. Only two of the nine sample input
Suppliers borrowed money from banks in 1987. One of them
obtained a long-term loan to finance the acquisition of fixed
assets while the other Secured a short-term loan to augment his
working capital. Only the latter seems to be able to link the
formal credit market with the informal credit market. The reason
why the majority didnot borrow from bank is that they have
access to trade credits. In fact, all of the sample input
suppliers availed of trade credits from manufacturers of raw
materials.
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Depositor Security seems to be less of a concern to
participants in the ICMs. It should be noted that in the past
few/years, a number of banks collapsed. Newspapers were then
full of s%ories about the predicament of depositors who tried to
claim their deposits from the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC). In contrast, none of the sample CCUs
experienced a run on deposits. In the case of the Sample
"paluwagan", two managers claimed that a member defaulted after
receiving the "sahod" (kitty). To prevent the "sahod" from
decreasing in the succeeding turns, the managers assumed the
defaultee's liabilities. This gesture is expected of "paluwagan"
managers thereby ensuring the security of the contributions of
the members. The presence of core members also gives some
semblance of stability to the "paluwagan".
IV. INTEREST RATE FORMATION AND TRENDS, COMPETITION BETWEEN
FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTOR, ICMS AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF
INNOVATIONS, INTERLINKAGE OF CREDIT WITH TRANSACTIONS IN
OTHER MARKETS, PROMOTING LINKS WITH THE INFORMAL SECTOR
Va rious segments of the ICMs have the ir own way of
determining the interest rate on savings deposit and loans. CCUS
which are the most organized among Segments of the ICMs claimed
to have based their interest rate on savings deposits on the
prevailing bank rates. During the period 1982 - 1986, the
average interest rate on savings deposits of CCUs is observed to
be consistently lower by about 1 percentage point than the
- - c
3_/
Core members are those who have been members of the Same
"paluwagan" units.
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average deposit rate given by banks (See Table 7).
Interestingly, savings deposit rates of both the CCUs and banks
seem to beinsensltive to inflation rate. Thus, except for 1986
when the inflation rate dropped_sharply to less than one percent,
savers have been penalized by bath CCUs and banks.
In Sapang Palay where no Ejnancial institutions operate, the
interest rate on deposits seem to reflect the opportunity cost of
capital. In particular, the moneylender who mobilizes deposits
pays 80 percent per annum for the deposits in 1987. This is much
higher than the inflation rate in that year which was only 3.8
percent.
Lending rates in the ICes vary according to type and size of
loans, maturity period, repayment scheme, type of lenders and to
the degree of monopoly power exercised by lenders. In the case
of CCUs, the determination of the effective lending rates is
somewhat complicated. Interesh rate payments are collected in
advance and additional charges (i.e., service fee, loan redemp-
tion insurance, collection charges) are being imposed. All these
have the effect of raising the effective interest rate. Table 8
shows that the nominal rate, which iS what is known to members,
is only half of the effective interest rate, the other half being
accounted for by the advanced payment on _ interest and other
charges. Indeed, the average effective lending rate of CCU
approximates the lending rate of banks. This has disproved the
off-repeated claim that CCUs charge lower lending rates than
banks.
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Table 7
TRENDS IN THE INTEREST RATES ON SAVINGS DEPOSITS
(Percent Per Annum)
CCUs Banks
Year ---- .... _'-" ......
Nominal Real Nominal Real
1982 8.6 -1.6 9.8 -0.4
1983 8.6 -1.3 9.7 -0.3
1984 8.7 -41.6 9.9 -40.5
1985 8.6 -14.5 10.8 -12.3
1986 8.0 7.2 8.6 7.8
Source: Table IV.I (Lamberte and Balbosa [1988]).
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Table 8
LENDING RATES OF CCUs, 1986
(In Percent)
CC US NR NRC NER
i. BVDCI 6.5 ii. 9 13.5
2. PSPDCi 7.0 18.7 23.0
3. CMDCI 6.5 17.3 20.9
4. DTDCI 10.8 21.6 27.6
5. MCMCCI 7.9 22.3 28.7
6. MVDCI 6.5 20.9 26.4
7. UPCCI 10.0 12.2 13.8
8. FEUCCI 9.0 13.0 14.9
9. DSE (CBP) KBCI 9.0 10.0 ii.i
10. PECCI 12.0 14.0 16.3
Average 8.5 16.2 19.6
Source: Table IV.2 (Lamberte and Balbosa [1988]).
Note: NR = nominal lending rate
NRC = nominal lending rate plus other charges
NER = nominal effective lending rate discounted in advance.
3O
Interestingly, lending rates greatly vary across CCUs
operating in Metro Manila. Even CCUs belonging to the Same
federation have different lending rates. The variation in the
lending rate is mainly due to the differences in the nominal
rates and service charges.
Variation in the lending rates cannot be completely
attributed to the geographic location of the credit markets. In
a Small urban community, we found that interest rate differential
among moneylenders for loans of the same maturity is quite
substantial (see Table 9). According to the moneylenders
interviewed, they do not bother to check the interest rate
charged by other moneylenders since they find this exercise
futile in view of the excess demand for credit in that community.
We tried to examine the components of the lending rates of
moneylenders. The results shown in Table 10 are somewhat mixed_
Moneylender A realized a net spread of only 1.5 percent despite a
very high lending rate. Two moneylenders, namely F and G, in-
curred a loss in their lending operations. Since they are new
entrants into the market, the loss incurred could be considered
as part of the sunk costs necessary to establish themselves in
the informal credit marketS. The other four moneylenders enjoyed
substantial profit margins. Moneylenders D and F who have the
biggest number of clients realized the largest spread. It seems
surprising though to observe that borrowers do not transfer to
moneylenders who charge relatively lower lending rates. The wide
dispersion of lending rates among moneylenders and the lack of
ability among borrowers to shift from one moneylender to another
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Table 9
INTEREST RATE CHARGED PER ANNUM BY MATURITY,
SIZE AND TYPE OF BORROWER
r
Moneylenders
A B C D E F G
A. By Maturity
(i) 1 - 7 days - - 91% - - 120% -
(2) 15 days ........
(3) 30 days - - 195% 224% - 120% -
(4) 45 days 97% - 195% - - - 96%
(5) 60 days 70% 97% - 137% - - -
(6) 90 days - 193% - - 175% 12@% 97%
B. By Size
(i) small same 97% same same same 60% same
(less than for for for for for
V2,000) all all all all all
(2) large - 193% .... 120% -
(V2,000
and more) iI
C. By type of borrower
(I) new 120% same same 190% same same same
for for for for for
all all all all all
(2) old 84% - - 140% - - -
Source: Table IV.7 (Lamberte.and Bunda [1988]).
Table 10
COMPONENTS OF LENDING RATES OF MONEYLENDERS
Items A B C D E F G
weighted average I_]
lending •rate 59.2 108.8 126.8 135.4 131.2 90.0 72.6
Less. Cost of Funds 45,0 60,'0 60,0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0
Gross Spread 14.2 48.8 66,8 75.4 71.2 30.0 12.6
LeSS : Transactions
Costs
1. Processing/ 3/
Collection Costs 4.2 10.4 1.8 2.5 0 0 0.7
2. Administrative
Costs 8.5 15.3 17.4 4.6 22.9 85.8 5.7
3. Cost due to 5/
delayed payments 0 0 0 9.2 0 9.8 17.3
9
4. Cost of default 0 0 0 0 0 20.0 1.8
Total 12.7 25.7 19.2 16.3 22.9 115.6 25.5
Net Spread 1.5 23.1 47.6 59.1 48.3 -85.6 -12.9
!/
The lending rate is weighted by the relative frequency of loans by
maturity and is computed on the basis of nine months (i.e., January - September).
2_/
Refers to the actual cost of borrowed funds for moneylenders A and E.
The rest refer to the opportunity cost of using own capital which is assumed to
be the same as the cost of borrowed funds of moneylender E who is mobilizing
deposits. All are computed on the basis of nine months.
_3/
Taken from Table IV.8. (Lamberte and Bunda [1988]).
4_/
Salary of the moneylender based on the minimum wage of 754.5@ per day.
Part-time is equivalent to one-half day.
5/
Interest rate due to delayed payments (see Table IV.9).
6_/
Refers to actual cost Of loan default (see Table IV.9).
Source,: Table IV.12 (Lamberte and Bunda [1988]).
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are indeed an indication of severely fragmented capital . markets
prevailing even in a Small urban community like Sapang Palay.
The effective interest rate on trade credit is found to
consist of the explicit and implicit rates. The explicit rate
can further be broken down into the discount rate on post-dated
checks and plain interest rate, On the other hand, the implicit
interest rate arises out of price differential of inputs or of
outputs in the case of "tie-in" credit arrangement. The results
of estimating the effective i_terest rate on trade credits and
their components are presented in Table II.
The discount rate on post-dated check is almost the same for
pl_in trade credit and tie-in credit. The same is true of the
plain interest rate. However, the implicit interest rate on
trade credit greatly differs between the two sources of trade
credit. The implicit interest rate charged by input Suppliers is
twice as high as the implicit interest rate charged by
wholesalers_traders who are also input suppliers' This result
needssome explanation.
Wholesalers/traders have usually marketing contracts with
big retailers or exporters. TO assure themselves of a steady
Supply of footwear manufacturers, theyengage in tie-in arrange-
ments with footwear manufacturers. This is the best way they can
reduce business risk arising from non-delivery of goods when they
have no control on production. Since footwear manufacturers have
alternative outlets for their products and have also alternative
Sources of inputs, wholesalers/traders are therefore compelled to
4-
Table ii
COMPONENTS OF EFFECTIVE INTEREST RATE
Source/Component Percent per year Percent Share
A. Plain Trade Credit
_Inpu t/Suppl iers:);
Discount rate on
post-dated checks 33.18 28.51
Plain interest rate 7.35 6.32
Price differential 75.84 65.17
Total 116.37 100.00
B, Tie-in Credit (Whole-
_@lers/t_aders who are
als0 input @uppliers)
Discount rate on
post-dated check 31.84 40.67
Plain interest rate 9.60 12.26
Price differential 36.85 47.07
Total 78.29 i_0.00
Source: Table IV-20 (Lamberte and Jose [1988]).
3_
give footwear manufacturers a better price for their products.
This is corroborated by another finding which shows that when it
co_es to dealing with wholesalers/ traders, footwear
manufacturers claimed to have dictated the price of their
products. The marketing contract also reduces the risk of
default on the credit wholesalers/traders extended to footwear
manufacturers.
This is not, however, the case with input suppliers who are
solely supplying inputs. Footwear manufacturers find the neces-
slty of borrowing from them since their working capital is tied
up with the trade credits they extended to their customers.
Therefore, input suppliers can exercise some degree of pricing
power which is reflected in greater overpricing of inputs.
The total effective interest rates charged by input
suppliers and wholesalers/traders who are also input suppliers
are 116.37 and 78.29 percent per annum, respectively. As already
pointed out above, the difference can be mainly attributed to the
implicit interest rate charged by both sources of trade credit.
In bothcases, the implicit interest rate accounts for the major
proportion of the total effective interest rate on trade credits.
It iS to be noted that the effective interest rates paid by
footwear manufacturers for their trade credits are substantially
higher than the interest rate charged by pawnshops and finance
companies. However, these are not substantially different from
those charged by informal moneylenders,
36
In determining the effective interest rate, results show
that input suppliers discriminate between small and large firms.
In particular, Small firms are charged higher rates than large
firms. The customers of the latter are usually big, well-
established department stores, such as Shoemart, Isetann, COD,
Fairmart, etc. Post-dated checks issued by these customers are
considered less risky compared with those issued by small
retailers, and therefore, they command a lower discount rate. In
addition, large footwear manufacturers are found to have better
bargaining power with their input suppliers compared with small
ones, and therefore, they are able to get better terms. In other
words, larger firms are charged lower implicit interest rate on
their trade credits than small firms.
Another interesting result we found is that input suppliers
determine first the total effective interest rate, and then
adjust the relative shares of explicit and implicit interest
rates.
Table 12 presents a comparison of the lending rates among
segments of the formal and informal sectors starting from 1981
when interest rates were liberalized up to 1986. The lending
rates greatly vary among these segments of the financial markets.
Banks and CCUs appear to have the lowest lending rates. If we
add the implicit interest rate to the discount rate on post-dated
checks, then the effective interest rate on trade credits could
have been the highest among the interest rates of the various
Segments of the financial markets. Interestingly, the real
lending rates of the various segments of the financial market
37
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established an increasing trend since 1981. The trend was
interrupted in 1984 and 1985 when inflation rates soared to 5_.3
and 23.1 percent, respectively, but then again it re-established
itself in 1986 when the economy started to stabilize. One
implication of these results is that the interest rate
liberalization failed to encourage more competition in the
financial system. Other policies, such as the overly restrictive
bank entry and branching policies could have negated the effects
of interest rate liberalization. In view of the oligopolistic
market structure of thebanking system, the interest rate liber-
alization gave banks an opportunity to raise the lending rates.
It has been observed that the real bank spread has widened since
the removal of the interest rate ceilings (see Lamberte [1987]).
Results Seem to suggest that the increase in the lending rates in
the formal sector have spilled over intothe informal sector.
For a credit market to be sustainable in the long-run, the
repayment rate should be reasonably high. Loan repayment partly
hinges on the financial practices being used. ICMS tend to
create financial practices that Suit well the cash flow pattern
of borrowers. In a low-income Urban community, we found a
variety of "paluwagan" from which a member can choose depending
on how much money he/she wants to raise and on her cash flow
pattern. Thus, one may join a da_ly "paluwagan" that requires
small amount of contribution or one that demands a bigger amount
of contribution (see Table 13).
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CCUs have also fashioned out repayment schemes that• take
into consideration the cash flow pattern of their members. Thus,
in the case of institution-based CCUs where members receive their
Salary every 15th and 30th of the month, loan repayments• are
scheduled on•these days. In addition, longer loan maturities
ranging from 5 to 48 months are granted to members because of
their security of tenure in the institution where they are
working. In contrast, market-based CCUs use a daily repayment
scheme because of the high cash turnover of their members.
Understandably, loan maturities are much•shorter, not exceeding
200 days.
Moneylenders offer various payment schemes to different
borrowers to suit the latter's needs and paying capacity. There
are three (3) general payments schemes observed. One payment
scheme is called "steady".• Loans under this scheme do not have a
maturity date • but the interest on the principal is paid every
month. It is up to the borrower when to pay part, or the whole
of the loan principal. Borrowers under the "steady" payment
scheme are mostly businessmen who are "suki" of the moneylenders.
in effect, moneylenders become the preferred shareholders of the
borrowers' businesses. ••
The second scheme iS called the "revolving" payment scheme.
Under this scheme, loans have definite maturity dates and there-
fore do not stay idle in the hands of the borrowers. Borrowers
may select either daily, weekly of hi-monthly payment of princi-
pal and interest. Interest payments are not collected in ad-
vance. A variation of this scheme is one which has no fixed
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amortization schedule. The only requirement is that the
principal and interest should be paid within the agreed maturity
date. This scheme is offered to anybody who is willing to pay
the interest.
The third payment scheme is called "Balikbayan" (returnees).
Under this scheme, borrowers may ask for a loan from the same
moneylender any time they want. In Tagalog, these borrowers are
called "balik ng balik" borrowers, that is, they always go back
to the Same moneylender to borrow. In effect, borrowers have a
credit line with moneylenders without a pre-established maximum
credit line. Only the most creditworthy among the borrowers of
the moneylenders can avail of this facility. Usually, these
borrowers are businessmen who are in need of cash to finance
their inventory. Both the principal and the interest under this
scheme arepaid within one day or one week.
Table 14 shows the distribution of the number of loans
granted according to the abovementioned three types of loan.
"Revolving" credit is themost popular type of credit. The
proportion of loans granted under this scheme to total number of
loans ranges from 33 to 83 percent. As can be observed,
moneylenders granted a Substantial number of loans under the
"steady" scheme. The proportion varies from 15 to 42 percent of
the total number of loans granted. The absence of any fixed
maturity on the loan makes it very attractive to borrowers.
In trade credits, the Security instrument created is the
post-dated check. This iS considered the most highly negotiable
42
Tabie14
DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER LOANS GRANTEDBY MONEYLENDERS
ACCORDING TO TYPE OF LOANS
(In Percent)
Moneylenders
Type of Loans A B C D E F G
I. "Steady" 17 20 42 30 15 20 31
2. "Revolving" 83 50 33 40 6@ 80 69
3. "Balikbayan" 30 25 30 25
i i
Total 10_ 100 100 11_ 10_ 100 10_
_2 ---- Z 5Z''2 _ _ _ _ C ____ ' , _
Source: Table IV.5 (Lamberte and Bunda [1988]).
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instrument. In case the issuer of the post-dated check defaults,
the footwear manufacturer who used it as a security for hls trade
credits is still liable to the input Supplier who granted him
trade creditS.
The formal financial institutions areeither slow or are not
inclined to adopt the innovations introduced by the ICMs, One
probable reason is that thoSe innovative techniques do not fit to
i
the size and character of the formal financial institutions such
that by doing them, they would be operating in the region of
diseconomies of scale. One big bank, namely the Philippine
Commercial International Bank (PCIB), trled to solve this problem
by creating the so-called "moneyshops". These are Small units
licensed by the Central Bank to operate in certain locations,
notably public markets. The moneyshops' operations are patterned
after those of moneylenders. Lately, PCIB opened a Shoe Industry
DeSk in its Marikina branch. The target clientele of its special
credit program are the footwear manufacturers, not the input
suppliers. In fact, it tries to compete with input suppliers in
discounting post-dated checks by offering a lower discount rate
usually one percentage point below the discount rate charged bY
input suppliers. However, the competition put up by PCIB is
Still limited to the so-called "prime" checks which are issued by
big and well-known department Stores in the country. This
suggests that the formal sector competes with the informal sector
only in less risky financial instruments. With the large volume
of post-dated checks floating around in the Marlklna shoe indus-
try, the participation of PCIB in the market for post-dated
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checks •washardly felt by the majority of the input suppliers we
interviewed.
One innovative financial Scheme which is gaining popularity
among federations of CCUs is the So-called "interlending scheme"
or central liquidity fund. CCUs are basically unit banks, like
our rural banks. Unlike branches of commercial banks, CCUs do
not have funds transfer mechanism to enhance their profitability
whenever •they have excess or insufficient funds. Also, since
they belong to the informal sector, CCUs do not have access to
the rediscounting window of •the Central Bank to deal with their
short-term liquidity problem. The "interlending scheme" is
designed mainly to cope with this problem. Member CCUs contri-
bute to the general fund managed by the federation and can borrow
several times their contribution. With this scheme, surplus CCUs
would have a ready outlet for their excess funds, while deficit
CCUs or those experiencing sudden increase in the •demand for
credit can immediately access external funds without resorting to
credit rationing. CCU federations which have this scheme find
such activity highly profitable.
Instead of competing with•the ICMs, some banks are currently
devising schemes to Strengthen their linkage with the ICMs. One
such scheme being seriously considered is the "wholesale-retail"
program in which banks provide wholesale credlt to credit union
federations which, in turn, retail them to their member CCUs.
This is designed to exploit the comparative advantage of both
institutions. Those federations which have already an
45
"interlending scheme" Should find less difficulty in adopting
Such scheme.
The issue on interlinkedtransactions waspartly dealt with
earlier when we discussed interest rate formation in the ICMs.
We wish to discuss here additional information which we gathered
from the results of the study. The interlinked transactions in
theurban sector were examined by studying the borrowing behavior
of a sample of footwear manufacturers. Results show that about
24 percent of the sample footwear manufacturers obtained trade
credits from wholesalers/traders who are also input suppliers.
It seems that the practice Of interlinking credit with the
product markets is also prevalent in the urban, manufacturing
sector. Of the total value of trade credits obtained by the
sample footwear manufacturers in 1986, 15 percent were contri-
buted by wholesalers/traders who are also input suppliers.
Accordingly, interlinked transactions have declined recently due
mainly to the sharp decrease in the demand for footwear by
foreign buyers. Apparently, wholesalers/traders who are also
input suppliers are catering more to the export markets than to
the local markets. Obviously, they have difficulty in penetra-
ting the local markets because footwear manufacturers can have
direct contact with local customers, like department stores and
supermarkets.
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V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This paper has tried to pull together the major findings of
the various studies on the urban ICMs. The results have
certainly increased our understanding of the workings of some
segments of the urban ICMS. For instance, informal institutions
have successfully mobilized significant amount of deposits from
non-wealthy individuals/households. Loan repayment schemes that
have been devised by the ICMs take into consideration the cash
flow pattern of borrowers. This helps ensure high repayment
i
rates. Certainly, better insights on the operations of ICMs can
be obtained once the results of all studies on ICMs under this
project are integrated.
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